Con base en la propuesta de Norberto Bobbio en El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, de 1979, este artículo presenta una aproximación a la relación antitética entre la guerra y el derecho, es decir, aquella en que se considera la guerra como antítesis del derecho, en el contexto histórico de la guerra civil de 1859 a 1862 en la Confederación Granadina. El análisis teórico planteado, que remite a la visión estatalista y moderna de la guerra (...) civil, se complementa con un componente histórico, por medio de un ejercicio de rastreo de sentidos de la mencionada relación antitética, en las cartas que, a propósito de algunos eventos de la guerra citada, intercambiaron el presidente Mariano Ospina y el general Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es resaltar el papel de la poesía como elemento esencial en el proyecto de independencia, en su doble condición de, por una parte, instrumento creador de la nueva realidad emancipada y, por otra, de construcción de un imaginario de nación en clave republicana. El texto ofrece una lectura de los poemas La victoria de Junín. Canto a Bolívar de José Joaquín de Olmedo y Alocución a la poesía. Fragmentos de un poema titulado “América” y La (...) agricultura de la zona tórrida de Andrés Bello. El análisis se centra en estos poemas por considerarlos fundamentales para la configuración del imaginario de nación de los pueblos americanos. La hipótesis del texto es que ante la falta de un imaginario propio, la poesía será esencial por su función figurativa, y que son los poetas-próceres los que suplen la falta de un pasado común y propio en torno al cual pudiera construirse la nación como comunidad imaginada. (shrink)

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

Presentaré formalmente la reología como una filosofía precisa. Hoy hemos de habérnoslas con nuestras herramientas que no pueden ser, por razones que veremos, ni la epistemología ni la ontología clásicas; requerimos de «noología» y «reología», filosofías incoadas en el pensamiento de Xavier Zubiri. Teniendo a la noología por realismo de partida en el que «realidad es» modo de quedar las cosas en la aprehensión, y a la reología por realismo de llegada en el que la constitución estructural de las cosas (...) «es realidad», la metafísica queda purgada de lastres vetustos. Todo se presenta en dos partes: I) Escasez de reólogos, expondremos qué se entiende por «noología» y por «reología». II) Realidad, expondremos el problema de los «dos» realismos («de partida» y «de llegada»), lo concretizaremos en la filosofía de Zubiri y veremos que «ambos» son más bien uno solo. Concluiremos que, si queremos tener una filosofía pertinente para el conocimiento contemporáneo del mundo sin limitarnos a un estudio escolar de un autor, hemos de hacer reología. (shrink)

I reinterpret the experiences and perceptions of child migrants through the lens of racialization and White Supremacy by advancing work by Cheryl Harris (1993) and Lisa Guenther (2019) on the critical phenomenology of “Whiteness as Property” (WaP) and the protection of “White Space.” WaP is “the collective investment in state violence” to protect the economic, territorial, and legal privileges of Whiteness, while White Space describes its two dimensions: “enclosure and territorial expansion” (Guenther 2019, 202). I build on this foundation by (...) examining the way WaP regulates sociogenic3 and emotive states in order to protect its accrued resources, resulting in an “economy” of racial identity where ownership produces and is produced by particular societal structures and relationships. I use these concepts to understand the framework that willfully misinterprets racialized children. I establish “the Child” as a sociogenic concept and symbol of national futurity and universalism, and therefore of the futurity and universalism of Whiteness; reiterating and interrogating the inconsistency that many immigration and child activists point to, that there is no such thing as an “illegal” or racialized child. Thus, the ICM either loses the privileges and protections afforded to children or must don the White Mask through a performance of victimhood. Through this framework, I undertake an examination of the ICMs as portrayed in the legal process using tools from legal sensorial studies and critical phenomenology, demonstrating the sociogenic shifts that occur for the ICM and how these shifts work to protect WaP. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar una recopilación de datos aparentemente aislados en sus campos, que muestran cómo la variable ritmo constituye un factor de organización central en la cognición de un amplio rango de especies y en diferentes funciones vitales. La exposición de evidencias servirá para considerar este componente de la música como clave para la organización de la experiencia. La definición de ritmo, articulada más allá de su concepción estética, partirá de la perspectiva de la cognición corporeizada, que (...) apoya la translación de la representación del ritmo auditivo hacia su comprensión como forma de pensamiento corporeizado, ofreciendo otro punto de superación dualista del estudio de las capacidades de cognición. Los argumentos se organizarán en cuatro ámbitos: el del marco teórico de la cognición corporeizada, el estudio evolutivo del desarrollo humano infantil, el rastro de las habilidades rítmicas en otras especies y la consolidación de intervenciones rítmicas aplicadas a diferentes patologías. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze a type of epistemic injustice in the field of criminal procedural law. The central research question is: can reverse onus in criminal trial lead to epistemic injustice? To address this question, the text will be divided into three parts. First, we examine the concept of epistemic injustice and its various modalities. Second, we present the conditions under criminal trials in an epistemic setting. We characterize the criminal trial in an epistemological key. Finally, in third place, (...) we present why a change in the institutional design (the burden of proof) leads to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

As Social Economy financial institutions, credit unions have traditionally been considered less efficient than traditional banking entities. However, like banks and savings banks, they have to be as efficient and competitive as possible to survive in today’s business environment, especially at times of crisis. To date, there have been very few studies on their efficiency and practically none for the crisis period. Moreover, almost all the existing studies assess only financial efficiency, without considering their social function. This study examines the (...) levels of both financial and social efficiency in Spanish credit unions as well as their main determinants during the recent crisis. We apply the two-stage double bootstrap data envelopment analysis methodology based on panel data corresponding to all the credit unions active in Spain between 2008 and 2013. The empirical results indicate that financial and social efficiency achieved an acceptable level, although on average the former was slightly greater than the latter. We also find that both age and merger and acquisition activity were positively influential on the financial efficiency of credit unions but had a significant negative effect on their social efficiency. Moreover, the regional location of such entities and the financial crisis were also crucial determinants of both types of efficiency. Our findings are therefore useful for all the stakeholders of credit unions to know if these entities have been efficient according to a double bottom line accounting in the crisis period and hence to maintain successful social management that is compatible with satisfactory financial efficiency. (shrink)

The three ancient philosophical introductions translated in this volume flesh out our picture of what it would have been like to sit in a first-year Philosophy course in ancient Alexandria. Ammonius (AD 445-517/26) set up a new teaching programme in Alexandria with up to six introductions to the philosophy curriculum, which made it far more accessible, and encouraged its spread from Greek to other cultures. This volume's three introductory texts include one by his student Olympiodorus and one each by Olympiodorus' (...) students Elias and David. Elias' Introductions to Philosophy starts with six definitions of Philosophy, to which David adds replies to the sceptical question whether there is such a thing as Philosophy. Olympiodorus' text translated here is an Introduction to Logic, which is just one of the three introductions he wrote himself. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta el proyecto “Educación sin Fronteras”, realizado por la administración de la Institu-ción universitaria Tecnológico de Antioquia —TdeA— entre 2008 y 2010 para la ampliación de la cobertura en educa-ción superior en las subregiones del departamento de Antioquia. El trabajo esboza la plataforma de los planes de desa-rrollo del departamento de Antioquia y del TdeA; plantea el modelo de regionalización de la educación superior y presenta estadísticas del programa. Se examinan los municipios atendidos, la cobertura de estudiantes, el (...) número de grupos, los egresados efectivos, los programas académicos, la correspondencia entre el programa y la vocación econó-mica de la municipalidad, etc. Termina con un análisis financiero del modelo de regionalización y concluye con los principales retos del modelo. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on a theory of the ideological public sphere in the age of digital media. It describes the public sphere as an initially ascending and then descending communication process that includes both polarising and integrating publics, which are organised by antagonistic media and compromise-building mass media. This framework allows us to distinguish between hegemonic, populist, and popular-oriented flows of communication, as well as register changes in the interplay of different publics driven by digital media platforms. Digital transformations of (...) the public sphere give rise to antagonistic and networked-individualistic flows of populist communication that put public hegemony under constant pressure. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen popular communications that enable democratic learning processes and the flourishing of communicative competences of all citizens. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo presenta un análisis ético-político del fenómeno de discriminación como consecuencia de lo que Bauman llama espaciamientos sociales, explorando además las consecuencias biopolíticas que se derivan de estos. El soporte filosófico ha sido estructurado a partir de autores como Rorty, Walzer, Simmel, Nussbaum y Esposito, recurriendo al diálogo interdisciplinar con horizontes teóricos como los de la antropología social y la sociología. El aporte significativo de este texto está en que profundiza y amplía desde la filosofía la teoría de (...) los espaciamientos sociales, recurriendo a conceptos como círculo del nosotros, fantasía de pureza, conciencia de inadecuación y experiencia emocional.: This paper presents an ethical-political analysis of the phenomenon of discrimination because of what Bauman calls social spacing, also exploring the biopolitical consequences derived from these. The philosophical support has been structured from authors like Rorty, Walzer, Simmel, Nussbaum and Esposito, resorting to interdisciplinary dialogue with theoretical horizons such as those of social anthropology and sociology. The significant contribution of this text is that it deepens and broadens the theory of social spacing from philosophy, using concepts such as circle of us, fantasy of purity, awareness of inadequacy, and emotional experience. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo presenta un análisis ético-político del fenómeno de discriminación como consecuencia de lo que Bauman llama espaciamientos sociales, explorando además las consecuencias biopolíticas que se derivan de estos. El soporte filosófico ha sido estructurado a partir de autores como Rorty, Walzer, Simmel, Nussbaum y Esposito, recurriendo al diálogo interdisciplinar con horizontes teóricos como los de la antropología social y la sociología. El aporte significativo de este texto está en que profundiza y amplía desde la filosofía la teoría de (...) los espaciamientos sociales, recurriendo a conceptos como círculo del nosotros, fantasía de pureza, conciencia de inadecuación y experiencia emocional.: This paper presents an ethical-political analysis of the phenomenon of discrimination because of what Bauman calls social spacing, also exploring the biopolitical consequences derived from these. The philosophical support has been structured from authors like Rorty, Walzer, Simmel, Nussbaum and Esposito, resorting to interdisciplinary dialogue with theoretical horizons such as those of social anthropology and sociology. The significant contribution of this text is that it deepens and broadens the theory of social spacing from philosophy, using concepts such as circle of us, fantasy of purity, awareness of inadequacy, and emotional experience. (shrink)

La professionnalisation des enseignants comme facteur contribuant à la qualité de l’éducation répond, en partie, à la formation qu’ils ont reçue. Dans le système pédagogique de l’alternance, en raison de la diversité des éléments et des acteurs qui interviennent, l’enseignant se pose une série de difficultés liées à la pratique de ses fonctions qui en affectent la qualité. Dans cet article, à travers les résultats obtenus à partir d’entretiens semi-dirigés, une étude est présentée qui analyse le point de vue d’experts (...) dans le domaine de la formation des formateurs des centres d’alternance. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT or Google’s Bard have shown significant performance on a variety of text-based tasks, such as summarization, translation, and even the generation of new...

According to Ladyman, the world consists of nothing more than relations that relate to no particulars. Could the world be nothing but structure? In this chapter it is argued that even though there are a number of problems with the standard view of relations accompanied by a particularist ontology, substituting for it a world of pure structure is not progress. A world of pure structure would be no more than a Platonic entity, lacking any resources for concretization. Consequently, there would (...) be no possibility of distinguishing between a world-kind and its concrete instance or instances. It is also argued that the view has insufficient empirical motivation. The history of science does not support the claim that structure is preserved through theory change nor that the structural components of a theory are extricable from its ontological commitments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...) their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

According to Russell and Norvig’s (2009) classification, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the field that aims at building systems which either think rationally, act rationally, think like humans, or...

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

Wie erfährt man Anerkennung? Sebastian Bandelins an der Sozialphilosophie des Pragmatismus orientierte Weiterentwicklung einer kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung zeigt: Anerkennen ist nicht als Bestätigung vorgängiger Identitätsansprüche zu verstehen, sondern als ein sozialer Prozess, in dessen Verlauf sich bestimmte praktische Selbstverhältnisse realisieren - und sodann durch ihre sozialen Folgen in eine Krise geführt, vor diesem Hintergrund kritisch reflektiert und schließlich überwunden werden. Der Begriff gelingender Anerkennung muss sich schließlich darauf beziehen, wie dieser Prozess der Erfahrung, in dem Selbstverständnisse und Handlungsformen hinterfragt (...) und neu gebildet werden, in sinnvoller Weise organisiert werden kann. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158 Feminist Studies 46, no. 1. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. María Fernanda Olarte-Sierra and Tania Pérez-Bustos Careful Speculations: Toward a Caring Science of Forensic Genetics in Colombia Feminist Science and Technology Studies (STS) has recently opened up the question of care as a set of practices related to the sustainability of life.1 The field of feminist studies more broadly has extensively 1. This literature mostly comes (...) from Northern contexts and started to flourish with the seminal work of María Puig de la Bellacasa, “Matters of Care in Technoscience: Assembling Neglected Things,” Social Studies of Science 41, no. 1 (2010): 85–106. This essay gathers scattered feminist STS reflections on these issues and looks at them through the lens of care, including authors such as Susan Leigh Star, Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, Hilary Rose, and Annemarie Mol. The concept of care orienting this exercise of rereading these authors is proposed by Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring,” in Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives, ed. Emily K. Abel and Margaret K. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35–62. Before and after that essay came out, Puig de la Bellacasa published several other papers related to this issue, including “Touching Technologies, Touching Visions. The Reclaiming of Sensorial Experience and the Politics of Speculative Thinking,” Subjectivity 28, no. 1 (2009): 297–315; “‘Nothing Comes without Its World’: Thinking with Care,” The Sociological Review 60, no. 2 (2012): 197– 216; “Ethical Doings in Naturecultures,” Ethics, Place & Environment 13, no. 2 (2010): 151–69; “Making Time for Soil: Technoscientific Futurity and the Pace of Care,” Social Studies of Science 45, no. 5 (2015): 691–716; and Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017). All these publications have been widely cited by other authors, particularly in a special issue of Social Studies of Science on the politics of care published in 2015 (volume 45, issue 5). Other examples María Fernanda Olarte-Sierra and Tania Pérez-Bustos 159 studied how care, and associated practices such as transnational care chains, are feminized and precarious—involving an ethos embodied by those who actively work to maintain or preserve another’s life. Feminists have focused on the politics of care embedded in invisible jobs related to aesthetics, domestic work, child and elder care, and sexual activities and see all these tasks as related to the reproduction of life and culture.2 Central to this conceptualization of care is the understanding that these jobs are typically women’s work. There is a common association between this care and notions of “motherhood” as it relates to values such as compassion, love, and respect, which have been constructed as universally feminine. However, the main goal of feminist studies of care has been to deconstruct this association, particularly because it is imbued with the white, wealthy, heteronormative ideal of femininity that underlies a gendered division of labor. The reality is that class, race, nation, and gender determine who cares for whom, whether or not labor is paid, and to what extent care is exploitative. One strand of recent research problematizes both valorizing and criticizing care practices on the grounds that they are based on a rather homogeneous understanding of the feminine. Instead, these scholars seek to resurrect valuable feminist work without relying on essentialism of authors contributing to this discussion on care as an ethos for science include Ruth Müller and Martha Kenney, “Agential Conversations: Interviewing Postdoctoral Life Scientists and the Politics of Mundane Research Practices,” Science as Culture 24, no. 4 (2014): 537–59; Charis Thompson, Good Science: The Ethical Choreography of Stem Cell Research (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013); and Carrie Friese, “Realizing Potential in Translational Medicine: The Uncanny Emergence of Care as Science,” Current Anthropology 54 (S7): S129-S138. 2. From Latin America, see, for example, Luz Gabriela Arango Gaviria, Adira Amaya Urquijo, Tania Pérez-Bustos, and Javier Pineda Duque, eds., Género y cuidado: teorías, escenarios y políticas (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2018); Pascale Molinier and Luz Grabriela Arango Gaviria, eds., El trabajo y... (shrink)